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INTRODUCTION 
 
International human trafficking and enslavement have been issues 
throughout history. Today, human trafficking, specifically regarding trafficking 
for sexual services, reaches at least 118 documented countries and is one of the 
most profitable crimes globally.1 The majority of the roughly twenty-one million 
trafficking victims worldwide are women and girls.2 These victims are frequently 
induced into slavery through false pretenses, family members who sell them into 
the trade, kidnapping, or debt bondage.3 Occasionally, victims voluntarily 
integrate themselves into the sex trade, often while following the 
recommendations of another prostitute or seeking a greater income. Although 
victims are trafficked for various reasons including prostitution, domestic 
servitude, manufacturing, and agriculture, the focus of this paper will be on 
international human sex trafficking4 However, it must be understood that sex 
trafficking constitutes only about twenty-five percent of the global human 
trafficking network.5 
There was no internationally accepted definition for “trafficking” until 
2000, when the United Nations (UN) published a definition in Article 3 of the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (also known as the Palermo Protocol).6 Article 3 of this 
Protocol clearly defines human trafficking as: 
 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
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vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation.7 
 
This definition is specific, yet it encompasses many aspects of trafficking, 
including the act (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of 
persons), means (using threats, force, or coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, 
abuse of power or vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits), and 
purpose (exploitation) of trafficking. This comprehensive wording labels a wide 
range of people as traffickers and activities as trafficking; one would assume, 
therefore, that the introduction of the Palermo Protocol’s encompassing definition 
into international law would result in an increase in worldwide prosecutions for 
such offenses, especially in countries that signed the Protocol and agreed to adopt 
its definition. However, it appears that the Palermo Protocol’s wording for its 
human trafficking definition reduces its global support and therefore its strength. 
By 2012, 157 of the UN’s 192 members had ratified the Palermo Protocol; this 
agreement bound them to adopt the Palermo definition of human trafficking and 
construct the necessary legislation to criminalize such activities. However, many 
Protocol-ratifying countries that self-report compliance are, in fact, not.8 Also, the 
domestic sex trafficking laws of various countries contain definitions with 
significant differences from the Protocol’s. Why has the Palermo Protocol been 
ineffective and globally unenforced? This paper seeks to display that the Palermo 
Protocol is ineffective due to disagreements on wording, inaccurate reporting, and 
the UN's inability to enforce compliance. 
 
THE BROAD WORDING OF THE PALERMO PROTOCOL 
 
International disagreement regarding the broad wording of the Palermo 
Protocol’s human trafficking definition has led Protocol signatory countries to 
create their own definitions. These nations should either accept the Protocol’s 
human trafficking definition or begin international discussion to modify the 
definition to which they have agreed. “Destination” countries have an additional 
obligation to adhere to international legislation and provide acceptable national 
laws to protect victims of trafficking brought into their countries, especially 
because these countries have the financial and legal means to do so. 
One-hundred-forty-seven countries signed the Palermo Protocol, which 
requires them, per Article 5, to uphold and enforce the Protocol’s trafficking 
definition; yet many countries maintain definition variants within their own 
national sex trafficking legislation. Of course, having a definition which deviates 
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from that of the Protocol is not inherently incriminating. If a state has a broader 
and more encompassing definition than the Protocol, it may be able to prosecute 
and convict more traffickers than if it had simply adopted the Protocol’s 
definition. This rarely occurs, however, as more states have definitions that are 
narrower than the Protocol’s. This means that these states cannot prosecute or 
convict as many traffickers as the Palermo Protocol definition would allow, thus 
directly violating the Protocol. 
 
LEGISLATION ISSUES 
 
Compliance with and adaptation of the Palermo Protocol varies greatly 
among Protocol signatory countries: some countries define trafficking more 
broadly than the Protocol, and some have copied the Article 3 definition verbatim, 
but a majority of the signatory nations have adopted human trafficking definitions 
narrower than that of the Palermo Protocol, meaning that these countries reduce 
the number of traffickers they can legally convict.9 
Three main areas of dispute create differences among trafficking 
definitions: whether the victim’s consent is relevant; whether the victim was 
trafficked internationally or intranationally; and whether the victim received 
compensation for sexual employment. 
Although the victim’s consent is irrelevant according to the Palermo 
Protocol, many countries still consider consent an important factor in determining 
whether a person in a trafficking situation was actually trafficked. For example, if 
a woman agrees to be housed in a brothel under repressive conditions in a foreign 
country for the sole employment of sexual services, some countries would 
consider her to not be a sex trafficking victim because she consented to participate 
in such activities; however, the Palermo Protocol would disregard her consent. 
Because the Palermo Protocol focuses on the act, method, and purpose of 
trafficking, it ignores the victims and instead focuses on the traffickers. Thus, the 
consent of the person being trafficked is irrelevant to the definition of trafficking 
according to the Protocol. However, many countries, including the United States, 
consider consent a vital part of the definition: if a person consents to being 
trafficked, then the trafficker cannot be convicted.10 
Another aspect that creates differing trafficking definitions is international 
and intranational transportation. According to the Palermo Protocol, human 
trafficking does not require crossing borders, and therefore intranational 
trafficking is a legitimate, convictable crime. Some countries, however, consider 
transnational passage a requirement in their trafficking definitions.11 This 
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stipulation means that intranational sex trafficking is not a criminal offense, even 
if the victim is transported within the country. 
Finally, many countries require a lack of compensation for a service in 
order for an act to be considered trafficking. However, the Palermo Protocol does 
not differentiate between situations of compensation and noncompensation. These 
definition differences create extra offenses that must be established by a 
prosecutor in order to convict the criminal. For instance, the recruitment, capture, 
and harboring of a person are not enough to convict someone for trafficking in 
some countries, especially if the trafficking victim was compensated.12 
Legislative differences between the Palermo Protocol trafficking 
definition and the definitions of signatory countries are unacceptable. Per the 
Palermo Protocol’s Article 5, each state that signs the Protocol must adopt the 
Palermo definition of human trafficking and create legislation that ensures the 
criminality of trafficking.13 
Two researchers from Örebro Univeristy in Sweden, Katalin Kelemen and 
Märta Johansson (2013), analyze the legislative differences of five Palermo 
Protocol signatory states: Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands.14 Even though these countries have agreed to adopt and enforce the 
Protocol definition for human trafficking, discrepancies exist. For example, 
Swedish law requires the existence of an undefined “power relationship,” which 
does not appear in the Palermo definition and makes the conviction of accused 
traffickers more difficult.15 In Italy, the human trafficking definition is similar to 
the Protocol’s, except that the Italian definition does not include recruiting or 
receiving persons, effectively ignoring part of the trafficking market. Other 
countries in this study, such as the Netherlands and Hungary, are not yet entirely 
compliant with the Palermo Protocol but have been improving their national anti-
trafficking legislation. A lack of full compliance accompanied by legislative 
improvements toward compliance is an international trend as awareness of the 
human trafficking problem is gradually increasing. Some countries have only 
recently criminalized human trafficking and are still developing appropriate 
enforcement strategies.16 For example, the Netherlands has continued to make 
legislative improvements, most recently in 2009, and Hungary extended its 
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trafficking legislation as recently as July 1, 2013. Sweden made substantial, 
effective changes in 2004 and again in 2010 to include intranational trafficking as 
well as all forms of international trafficking.17 The transition from previously 
existing human trafficking legislation to laws compliant with the Palermo 
Protocol is a slow process that will take time to fully develop. However, countries 
are gradually creating laws that increasingly reflect the Protocol. This shows that 
countries may simply need more time to organize their anti-trafficking legislation. 
 
DESTINATION COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Unsurprisingly, many trafficked victims emigrate from underdeveloped 
countries seeking economic prosperity in a wealthier country. Political or social 
turmoil, population growth with an insufficient job market, and cultural bias 
against women are factors that make a country likely to become a sex slave 
supplier.18 Trafficked persons, therefore, travel from underdeveloped countries to 
“destination” countries, which are states that attract trafficked victims and/or their 
traffickers due to their wealth, opportunity for an improved life, and demand for 
sex workers. A country can also become a destination country if there is a mass 
migration movement from a neighboring country. For example, Israel increased in 
popularity as a trafficking destination due to migration from the East to the West 
after the Soviet Union collapsed.19 
Although the United States is portrayed in media and culture as having an 
enormous sex trade and being a popular destination country, the United States 
contains less than one percent of the world’s sex trade. Therefore, the many other 
countries that contain the international human sex trade must be scrutinized. 
Countries that have legalized prostitution, such as Italy, and countries with recent, 
rapid economic growth, such as Thailand, have a much larger issue with 
trafficking than the United States does.20 Fortunately, some of these well-
developed destination nations have the greatest legislative success against 
trafficking, primarily because they have the financial resources to create effective 
legislation.21 These countries have the obligation to construct effective laws 
because they have the means to do so. 
By contrast, impoverished countries that supply the trafficked victims may 
lack the financial and legislative ability to create effective anti-trafficking laws. 
Destination countries that lack financial stability may also have difficulty funding 
the creation of and enforcing effective anti-trafficking legislation. It may be 
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debated whether countries that lack the means to develop such laws should be 
given grace, allowing them to have noncompliant legislation. However, these 
countries can simply copy the Article 3 definition verbatim into their laws to 
effectively maintain compliance; therefore, there is no excuse for countries to 
have noncompliant anti-trafficking legislation.22 
Additionally, destination countries should expand their focus from finding 
trafficked victims to also prosecuting and convicting the traffickers and the male 
clients who provide the demand for sex slaves. Participating in the sex trade 
industry is currently a low-risk, high-reward endeavor. The low-risk atmosphere 
is caused by a lack of community and healthcare-responder awareness of 
trafficking warning signs, ineffective and unenforced anti-trafficking laws, and 
uninvestigated and unprosecuted trafficking crimes. Without the threat of arrest or 
conviction, there are no deterrents for trafficking propagators. For example, Israel 
has a deterrence issue. Their lack of enforcement regarding anti-trafficking 
legislation only encourages perpetrators to continue, while inappropriately light 
sentences given for sex trafficking offenses do not motivate perpetrators to stop 
such activities.23 
Also, the human trafficking industry is a largely prosperous one, as 
billions of dollars are earned annually by traffickers worldwide.24 One factor that 
may drive trafficking profits up is the underground nature of the market. The 
inconvenience of discretion and secrecy for traffickers can justify demands for 
higher commercial sex prices, which patrons are willing to pay. Furthermore, 
many traffickers may attempt to maximize their profits by reducing production 
costs, which leads to further victim abuse due to a lack of basic needs. 
 
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
 
All 147 Palermo Protocol signatory countries have agreed, through Article 
5, to enforce the Article 3 trafficking definition, outlined above. Many countries 
that have different definitions from the Protocol falsely report compliance with 
the international agreement.25 Of the countries that are compliant in writing, forty 
percent have yet to enforce their anti-trafficking laws and make a single 
conviction.26 The UN lacks enforcement power to guarantee that signatory nations 
adopt the Article 3 definition, as the anarchic nature of our international system 
makes enforcing compliance almost impossible. Additionally, the Protocol lacks 
explicitly stated levels of punishment for trafficking or related crimes covered 
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within the document.27 Although this is standard for international agreements as it 
respects individual states’ sovereignty, equal enforcement across the globe 
becomes a problem. Additionally, countries may misrepresent the prevalence of 
their sex trade and anti-trafficking legislation to receive aid, as explained in the 
next section, “Reporting Issues.” 
Even countries that are mostly compliant with the Palermo Protocol and 
have made steps toward such anti-trafficking legislation are not always effective 
in their enforcement of the Protocol. This negligence nullifies any attempts 
toward legislative compliance. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel 
have not been particularly effective in attempts to eliminate, or even reduce, 
human sex trafficking. The UK lacks a comprehensive law that holistically 
addresses human sex trafficking, and instead has formed various legislative pieces 
that, when compiled, address aspects of trafficking.28 When the UK made public 
steps against sex trafficking, their national raids led to a mere twenty-two 
prosecutions and only fifteen convictions. Israel has not yet criminalized 
prostitution, and its anti-pimping legislation remains unenforced. During 2011, 
Israel convicted only seven traffickers, an unreasonably low number considering 
its large human trafficking market.29 In Laos, steps toward criminalization are not 
being taken, and the government is actually moving backward as the Lao sex 
trafficking business is becoming increasingly deregulated. Public entertainment 
venues have subtly transitioned to places where remunerated sex can be 
obtained.30 These states, and others, must take greater steps toward the 
enforcement of anti-trafficking legislation and prosecution of human sex 
trafficking in order to see a reduction in such activities. 
 
REPORTING ISSUES 
 
Even though international organizations (IOs) and individual governments 
try to collect accurate data regarding the sex trade, as well as the legislation 
against it, their reports are often filled with false and misleading information. 
Some of these reports allow states to collect and self-report information regarding 
anti-trafficking measures, which often yields falsified data. For example, the 
United States has developed a tiered rating system to assess international anti-
trafficking actions and laws. Grading factors include the quantity and quality of 
anti-trafficking legislation, compliance with the United States Trafficking Victims 
Protections Act (TVPA), and whether the quantity of trafficking victims increased 
                                                 
27
 Kelemen and Johansson, “Still Neglecting the Demand,” 278. 
28
 Mandel, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 217. 
29
 Ibid., 220; 224-25. 
30
 Sverre Molland, “‘The Perfect Business’: Human Trafficking and Lao-Thai Cross-Border 
Migration,” Development and Change 41, no. 5 (2010): 839. 
7
Seideman: The Palermo Protocol: Why It Has Been Ineffective
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
in the past year.31 Although foreign governments, IOs, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) use this report, a primary issue with the data collected is 
that countries can self-report it. Because the United States provides financial 
incentives to countries that report active anti-trafficking legislation and activity, 
countries that rely on U.S. aid have an incentive to falsify information. 
Other factors outside of self-reporting may lead to incorrect data. Cultural 
pressures, such as societies in which women hold extremely low positions, might 
lead governments to ignore trafficking or prostitution problems. This obviously 
leads to incorrect information regarding these countries’ trafficking markets. 
Additionally, NGOs and IOs often find collecting accurate and current data about 
human sex trafficking difficult because it is a black-market economy; therefore, 
much of the market, as well as information about it, is hidden or muddled.32 
The overlap of and state-by-state variations in the definitions and 
applications of “migration,” “smuggling,” “trafficking,” and “slavery” also create 
challenges for countries and NGOs that wish to fight human trafficking.33 For 
example, the definition of sex trafficking in the United States combines 
smuggling, where a migrant usually consents to being internationally transported, 
and trafficking, where the victim is exploited for profit without consent.34 
Because “migration” contains a voluntary component, NGOs, IOs, state 
governments, and trafficking prosecutors must determine whether the accused 
trafficker also illegally transported victims. Specifically, Sverre Molland (2010), a 
researcher and anthropologist at Australian National Univeristy, focuses on the 
cross-border human sex trafficking and migration between Thailand and Laos. He 
discovered that, within this region, governments and nongovernment associations 
are struggling to separate voluntary migration from trafficking. Primarily, this 
confusion occurs because many women voluntarily migrate from Laos to 
Thailand seeking more prosperous employment in the sex trade industry.35 
Frequently, these women move their work across the border to avoid community 
members or prevent their families from discovering their profession.36 
In fact, some organizations that attempt to reduce and eradicate sex 
trafficking actually propogate such activity. For example, UN peacekeepers 
frequently hire prostitutes in their assigned crisis zones, obviously frustrating UN 
efforts to eliminate sex trafficking.37 
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Victims, themselves, often do not report their trafficking situation, even if 
they are in a safe environment. This can be because they do not trust authorities or 
aid workers to maintain their privacy and prevent them from being arrested for 
prostitution or because they fear retaliation from their traffickers or imprisoners.38 
Furthermore, dependence on their traffickers and fear of authorities (due to 
potential deportation or judgment) can act as barriers to self-reporting by 
trafficking victims.39 
Even Yury Fedotov, the executive director of the United Nations Office on 
Drug and Crime (UNODC), acknowledges the existing gaps in knowledge about 
human trafficking. In the Preface to the UNODC 2012 Global Report on 
Trafficking in Persons, Fedotov specifically asks states to assist the UNODC  in  
gathering complete and accurate data about traffickers and their victims so that 
the UNODC can create effective policies and responses by criminal justice 
systems.40 
 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
Despite the problems and complaints regarding the Palermo Protocol, the 
document itself is not necessarily a bad piece of legislation. It is comprehensive 
and inclusive, and, if enforced, could show promising improvement in reducing or 
preventing the global problem of human trafficking. The primary problems with 
the Protocol are not, in fact, problems with the Protocol itself. Instead, the lack of 
enforcement and compliance with the Protocol provide the primary reasons for its 
failures. 
Even though many issues exist regarding both the enforcement of and 
compliance with the Palermo Protocol, actions can be taken by individual states to 
increase the effectiveness of their fight against human sex trafficking. Rather than 
merely signing the Palermo Protocol and then writing different domestic laws, 
countries are obligated to voice dissent in order to improve the Protocol.41 Unless 
countries voice their disagreement, changes will not be discussed to improve 
international legislation. Proposed changes to the Palermo Protocol can be used to 
rewrite it, but only if these concerns are voiced. Additionally, preemptively noting 
which signatory countries deviate legislatively from the Protocol, and then 
establishing a timeline to create and enforce the new laws, might aid in global 
legislative consistency. 
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One solution that has been proposed is to change the Palermo Protocol’s 
focus. Currently, the Protocol primarily focuses on the criminalization of 
trafficking acts. Instead, the Protocol should contain multiple foci that criminalize 
not only the trafficking of persons but also the purchase of sexual favors. In this 
manner, traffickers, pimps, and clients can be prosecuted and convicted 
effectively. This will hopefully reduce the demand for commercial sex. Moreover, 
the Protocol should include an element that provides support and assistance for 
rescued sex slaves.42 
In certain countries where prostitution is legal, such as Italy and Israel, the 
criminalization of prostitution would deter women who otherwise voluntarily 
bring themselves into the market from further promulgating prostitution.43 
As mentioned above, the demand for sexual services fuels the market and 
therefore the sex trafficking industry. Countries should create laws that ban the 
purchase of sexual services from trafficking victims. If states already have such 
legislation, then governments should enforce such laws to decrease the demand 
for prostitutes.44 Of course, trying to prohibit the purchase of sex slaves, while 
leaving other forms of prostitution available, is extremely difficult. Some clients 
may be unaware that their prostitute is currently being held against her will, and 
most are unaware whether the prostitute came to her present location through 
migration or trafficking. For example, Finland criminalized purchasing sexual 
acts from trafficked victims; however, purchasers and local police find it difficult 
to determine which prostitutes are trafficking victims and which are not. One 
absolute way to decrease the demand for trafficked victims is to make the 
purchase of sexual services illegal, regardless of circumstance.45 This guarantees a 
decrease in demand for trafficked sex slaves. 
Many NGOs have accused certain governments of focusing on 
prosecuting criminals for trafficking-related offenses rather than trafficking itself, 
and contend that these governments do so because legislation for other crimes is 
firmer. This incomplete prosecution results in lighter punishments for the 
convict.46 Using alternative or additional crimes as a prosecution technique, due 
to the difficulties of convicting someone under human trafficking legislation, has 
not improved the trafficking situation or increased protection.47 In fact, such “easy 
prosecution” reduces trafficking risks and, therefore, might increase the human 
sex trade. Instead of merely prosecuting sex traffickers based on trafficking-
related offenses, such as illegally smuggling foreigners into the country or 
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abusing human rights of women in brothels or prostitution houses, prosecutors 
should try to convict the perpetrators for the trafficking offenses themselves. If 
the anti-trafficking laws of a country make such convictions a barrier to justice, 
then prosecutors must speak up in order to influence legislative change. However, 
transit countries (states that are neither destinations nor suppliers, but rather a 
human trafficking thru-way) should receive grace for convicting traffickers for 
trafficking-related crimes. Often, these governments have trouble sentencing 
traffickers because trafficking and exploitation have not yet taken place, so they 
can only convict the trafficker for applicable crimes, such as smuggling. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has demonstrated that the Palermo Protocol is ineffective in 
reducing global human sex trafficking due to disagreements on wording, 
inaccurate reporting, and the UN’s inability to enforce compliance from Protocol 
signatories. Many countries have definitions differing from the Palermo Protocol 
regarding victim consent, transport, and compensation. However, all countries 
that have signed the Protocol are obligated to adopt the Article 3 human 
trafficking definition, per Article 5. Even though some countries have adopted 
broader trafficking definitions than that of the Protocol, which allows for greater 
prosecution of traffickers, most countries have developed narrower definitions 
that instead reduce the number of trafficking convictions. These countries are not 
sanctioned for lacking Protocol-compliant definitions of human trafficking 
because cooperation is unenforceable. Additionally, many countries that do not 
have compliant definitions for human trafficking actually report full compliance 
to NGOs, IOs, and governments collecting data for analysis. This may be due to 
financial or cultural pressures that motivate certain administrations to hide their 
lack of anti-trafficking legislation and exaggerate their number of trafficking-
related convictions. 
It is worth noting that the regulation of the prostitution market and 
industry within a country is strongly connected to state sovereignty. Because of 
this, states can create their own criminal legislation.48 This international standard, 
although understandable, hurts attempts to standardize global legislation against 
prostitution and trafficking. In addition, some countries are worried that entirely 
criminalizing the sex industry, including voluntary prostitution, would drive the 
market even further underground, making it even harder to regulate and control.49 
Therefore, because prostitution-related legislation is in the control of individual 
states, no international body can force countries to criminalize prostitution. 
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Clearly, the Palermo Protocol has been unsuccessful in creating a unified, 
internationally-recognized trafficking definition that is enforced by its signatories. 
Reliable data should be collected by IOs, NGOs, and governments to better fight 
the global human sex trade. In order for these organizations to collect dependable 
statistics, countries that have signed the Protocol are obligated to voice concern 
regarding the human trafficking definition so that improvements can increase the 
Protocol’s effectiveness. Furthermore, educating businesses and the public will 
help people better identify trafficking victims and situations so they can actively 
participate in reducing the global sex trade. Additionally, countries should focus 
on legislation that both criminalizes prostitution to reduce the supply of sex 
industry participants, and incriminates traffickers and clients to reduce the 
demand for such services. Ultimately, the enforcement of anti-trafficking 
legislation is crucial to the reduction of the human sex trafficking market. 
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